JO Josué Ortega

Market design · School choice · Economic theory · Experiments

Josué Ortega

I study the efficiency cost of requiring fairness or strategy-proofness in resource allocation algorithms.
I'm particularly interested in their theoretical performance in random markets and their robustness to mistakes in the lab.

Senior Lecturer · Queen's University Belfast Associate Editor · European Economic Review PhD from the University of Glasgow · Advisor: Hervé Moulin
Explore research CV

Published in Theoretical Economics, JPE Micro, Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Mathematical Economics and Social Choice and Welfare

Featured by MIT Technology Review, Marginal Revolution, The Economist, Financial Times, BBC & Forbes

Current research

Working Papers

  1. 8
  2. 7
  3. 6
  4. 5
  5. 4
  6. 3

    Under review

    A Comment on School Choice Under Partial Fairness

    Single authored

  7. 2

    To be submitted

    Appeals and School Choice

    With Claudia Cerrone and Yoan Hermstrüwer

  8. 1

Peer-reviewed work

Publications

  1. 13
    The Large and Likely Inefficiency of Stable Matching Mechanisms

    Theoretical Economics · with Gabriel Ziegler, Pablo Arribillaga, and Geng Zhao

  2. 12
    What Pareto-Efficiency Adjustments Cannot Fix

    Journal of Political Economy: Microeconomics · with Gabriel Ziegler, Pablo Arribillaga, and Geng Zhao

  3. 11
    The Strategic Vulnerability of the Boston Mechanism in Random Markets

    Social Choice and Welfare

  4. 10
    The Distribution of Envy in Matching Markets

    Economics Letters · with Gabriel Ziegler, Pablo Arribillaga, and Geng Zhao

  5. 9
    School Choice with Independent versus Consolidated Districts

    Games and Economic Behavior · with Thilo Klein and Robert Aue

  6. 8
    The Cost of Strategy-Proofness in School Choice

    Games and Economic Behavior · with Thilo Klein
    -> extended abstract in the Matching under Preferences workshop

  7. 7
    Fair Cake-Cutting in Practice

    Games and Economic Behavior · with Maria Kyropoulou and Erel Segal-Halevi
    -> extended abstract in the Conference on Economics and Computation

  8. 6
    Obvious Manipulations in Cake-Cutting

    Social Choice and Welfare · with Erel Segal-Halevi

  9. 5
    On the Integration of Shapley–Scarf Housing Markets

    Journal of Mathematical Economics · with Kriti Manocha and Rajnish Kumar
    -> extended abstract in the Symposium of Algorithmic Game Theory

  10. 4
    Efficiency and Fairness in Cake-Cutting with Single-Peaked Preferences

    Economics Letters · with Bhavook Bhardwaj and Rajnish Kumar

  11. 3
    Multi-Unit Assignment under Dichotomous Preferences

    Mathematical Social Sciences

  12. 2
    The Losses from Integration in Matching Markets Can Be Large

    Economics Letters

  13. 1
    Social Integration in Two-Sided Matching Markets

    Journal of Mathematical Economics

Academic profile

Service
and teaching

Service

  • Board of Directors, Irish Economic Association
  • Programme committees: Conference on Economics and Computation, since 2023
  • Programme committees: Matching under Preferences workshop, since 2022
  • Co-Chair, Irish Economic Theory Network

Funding

  • ESRC Impact Acceleration
  • British Academy Small Research Grant (x2)
  • Marie Curie Seal of Excellence
  • Leibniz Association projects, co-PI

Teaching

  • Mathematics for Economics
  • Economics of Networks and Institutions
  • Game Theory and Market Design
  • Principles of Economics

Contact

Let’s talk about
market design.

j.ortega@qub.ac.uk

Queen's Business School
Riddel Hall
185 Stranmillis Rd
Belfast BT9 5EE
United Kingdom