Publications

Fair cake-cutting in practice, Games and Economic Behavior (2022)

Extended abstract on the ACM Conference on Economics and Computation.with M. Kyropoulou and E. Segal-Halevi[arxiv] [otree files] [data repository] [preferences] [instructions] [stata code] [slides] [video]

Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting, Social Choice and Welfare (2022)

with E. Segal-Halevi[arxiv]

On the integration of Shapley-Scarf markets, Journal of Mathematical Economics (2022)

Extended abstract on the Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory. with K. Manocha and R. Kunar[arxiv] [matlab code] [slides]

Efficiency and fairness in cake-cutting with single-peaked preferences, Economics Letters (2020)

with B. Bhardwaj and R. Kunar[arxiv]

Multi-unit assignment under dichotomous preferences, Mathematical Social Sciences (2020)

[arxiv] [slides]

The losses from integration in matching markets can be large, Economics Letters (2019)

[arxiv]

Social integration in two-sided matching markets, Journal of Mathematical Economics (2018).

[arxiv] [matlab code] [slides]

Working papers

Improving efficiency and equality in school choice [NEW]

with T. Klein [arxiv] [slides] [Matlab code] [R code] [1 hr video for general audience] [slides applied audience]Accepted at the MATCH-UP matching under preferences workshop in Vienna [link]!I will present this paper at the Econometric Society European Meeting Milan, CTN Barcelona, Economic Design Padua, Iowa Market Design Conference, and seminars at Boston College, Essex ISER and Glasgow. Comments are most welcome. The bound for average rank in RM was also independently discovered by Nikzad (with a very different proof using random graphs) and Sethuraman (who does not refer to Parviainen's work). Our work contains many other results regarding maximum rank, justified envy and performance with real Hungaria data which do not appear in those papers.

The strength of absent ties: social integration via online dating

with P. Hergovich[arxiv] [appendices] [stata code] [data] [replication instructions & data] [slides]

Some Reviews: MIT Tech Review & Timothy Taylor, editor of the Journal of Economic Perspectives & Alex Tabarrok from Marginal Revolution & New Scientist

Taught in the following classes: UCSD, Introduction to Mathematical Modelling & Corvinus, Social History Methods

What happens when separate and unequal school districts merge?

with R. Aue and T. Klein [arxiv] [slides]

Miscellanea

Equality of opportunity and integration in social networks, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications (2019)

[arxiv]

Playing tennis without envy, Mathematics Today (2016)

[arXiv] Winner of the ECM Catherine Richards Prize of the UK Institute of Mathematics.

Referee for

Journal of Economic Theory, Economic Inquiry, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Social Choice and Welfare, International Journal of Game Theory, Theory and Decision, Mathematical Social Sciences, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Games, AMS Mathematical Reviews.

MATCH-UP 2022 (program committee).

21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 14th Conference on Web and Internet Economics, 3rd Games, Agents & Incentives Workshop, RES Symposium of Junior Researchers 2018.

Grants

PI, ESRC Impact Acceleration Account - £12,200 + £12,200 from International Collaboration

Co-recipient of the following two Leibniz Association grants:

1 Design and impact of admissions rules for schools worth 330,000 euros.

2 Improving school admissions for diversity worth 340,000 euros.

Seal of excellence for Marie Curie fellowship worth 162,806 euros.

Belfast - North America Research Mobility Fund.

Queen’s Management School Research Funding Innovation Prize.

EssexLab Seedcorn Fund Grant.

Glasgow Principal's Early Career Mobility Fund.

Conference Co-Organization

Easter workshop on school choice, Belfast 2022.

15th workshop on matching in practice, Mannheim 2018.