Publications

Fair cake-cutting in practice, Games and Economic Behavior (2022)

Extended abstract on the ACM Conference on Economics and Computation.with M. Kyropoulou and E. Segal-Halevi[arxiv] [otree files] [data repository] [preferences] [instructions] [stata code] [slides] [video]

On the integration of Shapley-Scarf markets, Journal of Mathematical Economics (2022)

Extended abstract on the Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory. with K. Manocha and R. Kunar[arxiv] [matlab code] [slides]

Efficiency and fairness in cake-cutting with single-peaked preferences, Economics Letters (2020)

with B. Bhardwaj and R. Kunar[arxiv]

Multi-unit assignment under dichotomous preferences, Mathematical Social Sciences (2020)

[arxiv] [slides]

The losses from integration in matching markets can be large, Economics Letters (2019)

[arxiv]

Social integration in two-sided matching markets, Journal of Mathematical Economics (2018).

[arxiv] [matlab code] [slides]

Working papers

Improving efficiency and equality in school choice [NEW]

with T. Klein [arxiv] [slides] [Matlab code] [R code] [1 hr video for general audience] [slides iser]I will present this paper at the Econometric Society EM Milan, CTN Barcelona, Economic Design Padua, Essex ISER Seminar, Iowa Market Design Conference, Boston College Seminar. Comments are most welcome. The bound for average rank in RM was also independently discovered by Nikzad and Sethuraman. All other results about the maximum rank, justified envy and performance with real Hungaria data are still new! Plus our proof also brings new insights using Parviainen's work.Here is the proof that our work is independent

Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting, review and resubmit @ Social Choice and Welfare

with E. Segal-Halevi[arxiv]

The strength of absent ties: social integration via online dating

with P. Hergovich[arxiv] [appendices] [stata code] [data] [replication instructions & data] [slides]

Some Reviews: MIT Tech Review & Timothy Taylor, editor of the Journal of Economic Perspectives & Alex Tabarrok from Marginal Revolution & New Scientist

Taught in the following classes: UCSD, Introduction to Mathematical Modelling & Corvinus, Social History Methods

What happens when separate and unequal school districts merge?

with R. Aue and T. Klein [arxiv] [slides]

Miscellanea

Equality of opportunity and integration in social networks, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications (2019)

[arxiv]

Playing tennis without envy, Mathematics Today (2016)

[arXiv] Winner of the ECM Catherine Richards Prize of the UK Institute of Mathematics.

Referee for

Journal of Economic Theory, Economic Inquiry, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Social Choice and Welfare, International Journal of Game Theory, Theory and Decision, Mathematical Social Sciences, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Games, AMS Mathematical Reviews.

21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 14th Conference on Web and Internet Economics, MATCH-UP 2022 (program committee), 3rd Games, Agents & Incentives Workshop, RES Symposium of Junior Researchers 2018.

Grants

PI, ESRC Impact Acceleration Account - £12,200 + £12,200 from International Collaboration

Co-recipient of the following two Leibniz Association grants:

1 Design and impact of admissions rules for schools worth 330,000 euros.

2 Improving school admissions for diversity worth 340,000 euros.

Seal of excellence for Marie Curie fellowship worth 162,806 euros.

Conference Co-Organization

Easter workshop on school choice, Belfast 2022.

15th workshop on matching in practice, Mannheim 2018.